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BANK INSTABILITY PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE RIVERSIDE
CONSTRUCTION
Gennaro G. Marino, Ph.D., P.E.
Marino Engineering Associates, Inc.
Urbana, IL-USA 61801

Abdolreza Osouli, Ph.D.
Southern Illinois University Edwardsville
Edwardsville, IL-USA 62026

ABSTRACT
In this case study, the sliding of a riverbank during construction of a water intake facility in Tennessee was investigated and analyzed.
The construction of the project involved the installation of 2-36 in. diameter intake pipes from the wet well to the river inlet which
were 290 ft apart. An open cut excavation from the river inlet to the riverbank toe was used to connect the inlet to the tunnel-installedintake pipes on the land side. During the excavation, a 25 ft wide slide, which 4 months later widened by another 15 ft, developed to
the crest of the road on the riverbank. Consequently, a concern developed for the safety of the roadway. The geometry of the slopes
and the cuts, pre- and post-construction geotechnical subsurface investigation, construction history, and sliding conditions were
examined for the causes of the riverbank instabilities. The fundamental cause of the slides was the undermining of the latent bedrock
surface from subaqueous excavation into the riverbank.

INTRODUCTION
This study is a geotechnical investigation of the bank
instabilities associated with the riverside construction of the
Water Intake Structure in Tennessee. A general plan of the
water intake facilities along the river is shown in Fig. 1. This
water is transported by pipeline to be treated and then
distributed to neighboring communities. As can be seen from
Fig. 1, the intake structure basically consisted of the wet well
on the east side of a four lane roadway which is connected to
two 36 in. diameter intake pipes that are at an approximate
depth of 70 ft (i.e. planned invert elevation at 320 ft). The
intake pipes are installed inside 5 ft diameter drilled-in steel
casings from the shore well and below the road and a portion
of the riverside embankment for the four-lane roadway.
The specified method of construction was to tunnel from
inside the wet well to some point on the riverside of the road
and install the 5 ft steel casing and subsequently the 3 ft intake
pipes. For the remainder of the 290 ft from the wet well to the
inlet in the river bottom, underwater construction or tunneling
is specified. Consequently, underwater construction would
involve trench excavation. Because of the specified invert
elevation of 320 ft, this work would include drilling and
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blasting rock. Therefore, this project required sufficient
subsurface geotechnical investigation to address tunneling and
underwater excavation difficulties. Several design guidelines
and text books are available for designing of such construction
projects (Hoek, et al. 2000; Duncan and Wright 2005; Hung et
al. 2009).
In the following sections of this paper, the history of the
construction, associated ground conditions, and slide failure
analyses are provided. The purpose of this study is focused on
geotechnical investigation and field observations as two vital
factors, recommended by Peck (1969) in conducting any
construction project.

RIVERSIDE CONSTRUCTION HISTORY
“Production” drilling and blasting for the trench excavation
was performed from July 9 to September 10, 2002. A crosssectional view of the project conditions are shown in Fig. 2. It
should be noted that the drill-and-blast work began from the
inlet at Station 0+00 eastward towards the riverbank. The
drilling and blasting continued to about Station 1+00 to
September 10, 2002. The corresponding progress of the
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Fig. 1. Site plan of river intake area
trench excavation towards the river bank based on the
available data is given in Fig. 2. During the excavation into
the bank there were reports of minor subaqueous slides.
On September 11, 2002, river water began seeping into the
intake pipe(s) through the still unexcavated portion of the
riverbank. This water was sufficient in quantity that it was
pumped during off-construction hours to serve the community
needs. Pumping water was carried out during off-construction
hours. From about September 11, 2002, the contractor
intermittently conducted pin hammering, as well as more
localized drilling and “small shot” blasting near the casings to
break up the bedrock. The resulting broken rock and other
material were removed either with a clam bucket or a long
reach excavator. It should be noted that the ends of the 5 ft
diameter steel casings are located at about Station 1+00 (see
Fig. 2). To locate the exact position of the 5 ft steel casing,
the contractor blew compressed air through the upstream
intake pipe from the shore well and by October 10, 2002,
reported air coming out “good” through “loose rock”.
The first above-water slide occurred in the latter part of
October 10, 2002. This slide was located about 5 ft upstream
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to 20 ft downstream of the planned centerline of the intake
pipes up to near the crest of the embankment. A photograph
of this slide is shown in Fig. 3. On October, 11, 2002, there
were two large cracks reported by the guardrail. Later in the
day, this cracked portion of earth also slid off and the slide
reached to only 4 ft from the back of the guardrail. It should
also be noted that the recorded change in water level in the
adjacent river from the period of October 1 to October 10,
2002 was only 555 ft to 559 ft.
The contractor attempted to stabilize the above slide by
placing riprap on the failed embankment section assuming
bedrock was present, however, without toe support it raveled
off the slope. As an alternative, it was decided to merely
cover the slope with a tarp to prevent or minimize
precipitation for saturating the slope surface (see Fig. 4).
After “clamming” to remove the debris in the river bottom
from the landslide, the contractor continued their intermittent
pin hammering and localized drilling and blasting excavation
method to the 5 ft steel casings. The broken rock and other
material were removed with the long-reach excavator and
clam bucket, as well as performing hand excavation close to
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Fig. 2. Topographic profiles with ground conditions along the river bank during trench excavation

Paper No. 4.06a

3

by late March 2003 and performed during the period of severe
river conditions.
The temporary backfill was removed when minimal river level
fluctuations are expected.
The failed section of the
embankment was then properly backfilled with riprap to the
river bottom after 40 ft of pipe sections were connected to the
existing pipe below the embankment.

SLIDE AND ASSOCIATED GROUND CONDITIONS
Fig. 3. Photograph taken on 10/11/2002 of slide on
10/10/2002. Note pre-existing rip rap covering the slope and
that the slide progressed up the slope by the end of the day

The slope conditions on the east side of the river were studied
upstream and downstream of the intake excavation.
Conditions were observed from 1400 ft downstream (north) of
the project site to a point 800 ft upstream (south) in a rented
boat and by walking the slopes. Evidence of minor past slope
failures at the river line were extensive along the 2,200 ft long
section of the east bank and occur on both the upstream and
downstream sides of the intake alignment. The geometry of
the slopes consisted of three basic elements starting from the
top down to the river edge as follows (see Fig. 5 and Fig. 6):





Fig. 4. Air photo taken on 1/22/2003 of tarp covered slide
area with orange soil beneath tarp. Note river level on this
day varied from Elevation 355.6 to 356.3 ft
the casings. This excavation methodology appears to have
been used into February 2003. The extent of the trench
excavation for December 10-17, 2002 is also shown on Fig. 2.
It is worth noting that the riverside south bound lane had to be
closed down in early February. By February 7, 2003, the
upstream riverside pipe was installed to within a “1 to 2 inch
push” to connect it to the existing landside 3 ft intake pipe.
On February 20, 2003, another 15 additional feet of the
riverbank had slid down on the downstream side. This slide
was connected to the original slide. The total slide width
increased to about 40 ft. The recorded river had reached an
elevation as high as 378.3 ft on February 17, 2003 and on the
day of the slide the river had receded to elevation 370.2 ft.
After this last slide event, TDOT required that the entire slope
be stabilized with riprap, thus covering any pipe installation
work. This work was completed to support the embankment
Paper No. 4.06a

Upper vegetated unfailed slope
- Below (west of) roadway
- Approximate inclination: 40 to 46°
Immediate steep slope face (scarp)
- Approximate inclination: 78 to 90°
- Typical height: 4 to 7 ft
Lower flatter slope made up of failed soil and
displaced vegetation
- Approximate inclination: 10 to 33°
- Typical land width: 5 to 17 ft (east-west)
- Typical land height: 2 to 9 ft

Fig. 5. Typical cross-section of failed slopes east of riverside
drive in project location
At some locations, overhangs have developed along the tops
of the immediate slopes as a result of bank failure/erosion and
the presence of a thick root mat (see Fig. 7). It is important to
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note that the contact between the brown road embankment fill
and the red-brown decomposed rock/colluvium could be seen
at and above the water line at various locations. It was
observed that riprap blocks up to 5 ft in size have been placed
along the failed slopes in order to buttress and protect the
embankment supporting the roadway. The riprap contains
shot rock that has been placed on the toe of the river line slope
and against the vertical to near-vertical scarps above the water
line.

river flow (such as in February 2003) when the second slide
occurred. This slope failure mechanism involves oversteepening of the bank by erosion on the outside meander of
the river and/or excess pore water pressures in the slope as the
water level recedes. A submerged open cut excavation into
the toe of a soil slope during placement of the intake pipeline
would clearly reduce the stability of the bank similar to a
natural river erosional mechanism.

Fig. 6. Failed slope in east bank of river 210 ft south of intake
pipeline
Two basic soil types were exposed in the failed and limited
unfailed slopes along the east side of the river (see Fig. 7).
The upper soil layer in the exposed slope is basically a light
brown to dark brown silt or clay with man-made debris and
limestone blocks.
Based on the ASTM visual-manual
classification, the matrix which makes up most of the soil unit
is a low plasticity silt (ML). The upper layer is 10 to more
than 30 ft thick and makes up the embankment that supports
the roadway. The contact between the upper and lower soil
units slopes toward the river (west) at an inclination of
approximately 10° to 20° where visible. The contact varies in
elevation by approximately 5 to 7 ft in an upstream/
downstream direction.
The exposed lower soil unit is a red-brown to yellow-brown
clay with limestone fragments to boulder size material. Based
on the visual-manual classification, the lower soil formation is
a fat clay (CH). The soil has been developed by weathering of
the underlying limestone and shale and by mass movement
down the native slope.
The visible slope failures along the east bank of the river occur
primarily in the silty brown fill that makes up the highway
embankment. In local reaches, the failures include the upper
portion of the weathered rock profile and/or colluvium. Bank
instability is greatest during and shortly after periods of high
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Fig. 7. Overhangs above failed slopes related to bank
instability and root mat
In local reaches, the failures have progressed further up the
slope where stormwater pipelines emerge from the riverbank.
Water flowing from the pipe discharges on the slope and
erodes the soil beneath the pipe. Erosion progresses inward,
steepens the slope and ultimately causes the bank to collapse.
The resulting failures have contained fallen sections of the
stormwater pipes.
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At the time of the site visit, the slope above the intake pipeline
was covered by rip rap from the crest down to some unknown
distance below the water line. The general profile of the
repaired project slope above the pipeline was mapped as well
as the slopes immediately adjacent to the project alignment
(see Fig. 8). The inclination of the rip rap slope varies
between 27° and 42°. The steepest portion of the repaired
failed slope is 4 ft below the crest. The vegetated slopes north
and south of the pipeline alignment are inclined at angles
ranging between 36° and 46°.

GEOTECHNICAL INVESTIGATION
As part of the geotechnical design investigation, a total of 8
borings were drilled: 3 around the Pump Station Building (B1, B-4, and PZ-1), 3 immediately west of the wet well shaft
and east of the highway (B-2, B-3, and PZ-2), and 3 in the
river near the intake structure (B-5, B-6, and B-7) (see Fig. 1).
No design borings were drilled in or immediately above the
riverbank slope.
The B-series borings were augered to the top of the rock
without undisturbed sampling and then cored down to depths
of 2 to 14 ft below the specified tunnel invert (320 ft). The
core borings show a consistent top of rock (hard gray
limestone) elevation ranging between 357 to 359.2 ft (see
Table 1). The logs also reveal an upper weathered zone in
Borings B-2 and B-3 down to elevations of 341.4 and 348.5 ft,
respectively.
Table 1. Summary of Design Borehole Data in and near
Pump Station
Boring
Number

Top of
Rock
Elevation

Bottom Elevation
of Upper
Weathered Zone

Bottom
Elevation of
Borehole

B-1
B-2
B-3
B-4

357 ft
358.5 ft
359.2 ft
357.5 ft

347 ft
341.4 ft
348.5 ft
NONE

317.9 ft
310 ft
305.9 ft
309.2 ft

The PZ-series borings (PZ-1 and PZ-2) were augered to
refusal at depths of 25 ft (Elevation 365 ft) and 42.5 ft
(Elevation 347.5 ft), respectively. Split spoon and auger soil
samples were taken down to depths of 25 ft (PZ-1) and 16 ft
(PZ-2) below the original ground surface (Elevation 390 ft).
Two piezometers were installed in the PZ soil borings.
Fig. 8. Cross-section along riprap slope above intake pipeline
The 40 to 60 ft wide repaired slope is bounded by upstream
and downstream banks that failed in the past and older riprap
was visible above and below the water line. Clearly based on
a simple site investigation, there was ample evidence of
potentially unstable slopes at the river line near the intake
pipeline alignment indicating the bedrock surface at some
distance below the river level. Due to the close proximity of
the roadway to the edge of the bank (approximately 13 ft) and
the presence of visible slope failures upstream and
downstream of the intake pipe alignment, protection of the
roadway during tunnel/open cut construction would be a key
design issue.
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The boreholes (B-5 to B-7) were collared at depths of 17.8 to
22 ft below the water line. The bottoms of the borings were
drilled to depths of 3.6 ft above to 4.9 ft below tunnel invert.
The logs for the river borings confirmed “top of bedrock” at a
consistent elevation ranging between 336.2 and 337.4 ft. A
layer of boulders, riprap, mud-filled voids and
fractured/weathered limestone 0.2 to 7.1 ft thick is shown
above the bedrock surface. The materials above the bedrock
surface are weathered limestone/shale similar to the solutioned
rock below the soil contact beneath the Pump Station.
Moreover, these materials are not the same ML and MH soils
encountered above the limestone at the Pump Station Building
site.
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Between November 19 and 20, 2004, three additional auger
borings (R-1, R-2, and R-3) were drilled in the roadway on the
west side (see Fig. 1). The borings were located within about
20 ft of the crest of the slope on the north and south sides of
the alignment. The holes were drilled approximately 9 months
after the February 2003 landslide. The borings were advanced
using a hollow stem auger and were drilled to refusal. Split
spoon soil samples were taken every 2.5 ft in the upper 20 ft
of the hole and then at 5 ft intervals to refusal. No rock cores
were taken in the post-construction boreholes.
The post-construction boring logs show 15.5 to 18 ft of fill
above a colluvial/residual soil. The soil thicknesses and
elevations of the contacts in the actual soil profile near the top
of the slope are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Summary of Soil Thickness/Contact Elevations
Encountered in Post-Construction Borings Located Near the
Top of the Slope
Boring
Number

Fill
Thickness

Residual
Soil/
Colluvium
Thickness

Elevation
Fill/Soil
Contact

Elevation
Auger
Refusal

R-1
R-2
R-3

18 ft
15.5 ft
18 ft

27.5 ft
20.9 ft
23.9 ft

369 ft
371.5 ft
369 ft

341.5 ft
350.6 ft
345.5 ft

The fill below the highway is primarily lean clay (CL) with
clean sand (SP) layers. Standard Penetration Test values
range between 4 and 15 blows/ft. The fill also contains rock
fragments and organic/man-made materials. The residual
soil/colluvium is typically an orange, red and/or brown fat
clay (CH in the Unified Soil Classification System). Clays are
sensitive to moisture and undergo large reductions in strength
when exposed to water. A 5 ft thick layer of clean sand was
encountered in Post-Construction Boring R-1. In addition, a
soft, gravelly fat clay was encountered in Boring R-3 just
above the top of rock.

SLIDE FAILURE ANALYSIS
The post-construction geotechnical data revealed a lower soilrock contact than expected and fill/residual soil on the slope
below the Normal Pool Elevation (359 ft). According to
Boring R-2 the rock surface is 8 to 17.5 ft lower than the
indicated rock elevation based on the pre-construction
information (see Fig. 2). In addition, the actual preconstruction ground surface was discovered to be 8 ft west of
that shown on construction drawings. Therefore, the October
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sliding was obviously more deep-seated than assumed by the
contractor. Thus, the slope below the water line at Elevation
359 ft contained soils that would be and were highly
vulnerable to sliding as a result of the specified open cut
excavation. Placement of a single boring on Riverside Drive
would have at least alerted the Engineer and Contractor that
the elevation of the rock surface decreases toward the bank
and the soils might be present below the Normal Pool water
line. Moreover, boring(s) drilled at the edge of the river
would have more definitely outlined the presence of fill and
native soil in the slope and reveal that the toe of the soil slope
would be undercut by the specified subaqueous open cut
excavation.
Figure 2 shows the subaqueous trench excavation limits as the
work approached the riverbank. Available slope surveys
performed above the water are on October 18, 2002 after the
October 10-11, 2002 sliding and on August 12, 2003 after the
February 20, 2003 adjacent downstream slide; thus these
profiles approximate the sliding surface.
Also, superimposed on Fig. 2 is data from surveys performed
on December 11-12, 2002. The profiles which were taken
from the survey are located at the approximate centerline of
the October, 2002 sliding and the greatest undercuts on the
upstream and downstream sides.
The ground condition information presented on Fig. 2 consists
of the approximate fill/native soil and soil/rock contacts. The
soil/rock interface was determined from the “B” and “R”
borings, and is consistent with the sliding surface contour
map, project photographs, and field mapping.
As can be seen in Fig. 2, the soil portion of the slope was
undercut as the trench excavation preceded towards the bank.
On October 10, 2002 the approximate location of the cut was
at about Station 0+95. The “clamming” which was done by
the contractor on this same day resulted in the nearly 12 ft soil
undercut closer to the bank. Clearly this undercutting resulted
in the bank instability as the sliding commenced later that
same day. Based on the above data, a more representative
depiction of the slide configuration is shown on Fig. 2.
Consequently, the unstable slope condition resulted in the
February 2003 embankment failure triggered by the rapid
drawdown of the river.
The riverbank intake slope discussed herein was highly
susceptible to slope failure given the specified subaqueous
excavation. The subaqueous excavation in the plans and
specifications allowed for significant undercutting of the toe
of the soil slope. Consequently, this excavation methodology
was doomed for failure.
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The project plans and specifications established extensive
requirements to protect existing structures that could be
affected by intake shaft/tunnel construction, yet no such
provisions were required to excavate to the specified
stationing into the riverbank. The feasibility of an allowable
cut into the riverside bank of a height up to 35 ft to the pipe
invert at Station 1+00 should have been certainly investigated.

LESSONS LEARNED
A reasonable effort should be made to understand the overall
design concept of the project in order to identify critical
geoconstruction activity issues that could be associated with
that design. The subaqueous excavation to Station 1+00 was
carried out because the bedrock surface was considered
present at approximate Elevation 359 ft at the riverside slope.
Per design drawings, the top of the rock, east of the river, is
between Elevations 357 and 359 ft and is at the same elevation
as the ledge at the water edge at approximate Station 0+90 and
at the Normal Pool Elevation (359 ft).
With the interpretation that the soil slope is supported at the
riverside bedrock surface in the vicinity of Elevation 359 ft,
the open cut could be allowed to about Station 1+15 without
the toe of the soil slope being undermined. This interpretation
also assumed that the excavation face would be in solutioned
rock above sound rock and the rock face would be near
vertical because of the steeply inclined joints in the
horizontally bedded limestone and vertically drilled blast holes
from the available geologic data. There were no design
borings available at the edge of the river or at the top of the
slope, however, to verify the top of rock elevation prior to the
slide.
In addition to design, there should be sufficient subsurface
data to determine the feasibility of specified elements of
construction. For example, for this intake facility, borings and
test data were used to determine the shallowest elevation that
the tunnel could be placed without significant construction
difficulties. Similar feasibility design analyses would be
helpful for geotechnical design of the critical bank cuts.
The specified subaqueous excavation of the riverbank was
also particularly concerning because of the vulnerability to
sliding. Subaqueous excavation of the riverbank-embankment
of soil or mixed face (soil and rock) conditions did not provide
sufficient inspection or monitoring to adequately understand
the consequences of what is being done. More specifically, it
was not possible to conduct adequate visual inspection of the
most critical bottom portion of the slope for rock or soil type,
slope movements, or signs of distress and does not allow
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adequate control of the excavation as it proceeds inward into
the bank.
Therefore, subaqueous excavation is more
appropriate for bottom trenching and probably not into an
embankment slope protecting public work structures.
The bank sliding configuration in October 10-11, 2002 was
assumed “bottoming out” at about 361 ft Elevation, which is
consistent with the presumption that the bedrock surface is at
this elevation. Therefore, the contractor attempted to place
riprap on the slide surface to stabilize it.
Because the bedrock surface was actually over 17 ft deeper,
the riprap would not stay on the slope and raveled down to the
river bottom. After this attempt failed, the construction team
concluded that the best solution was to tarp the slide surface
until the intake pipe connections were made. After the bank
had steepened for the October 2002 event, the slope became
more susceptible to future failure from sudden drawdown
conditions.
After the first slide, a full investigation should have been
undertaken to assess the ground profile conditions. Proactive
support of the slope should be undertaken. A sheetpile wall
with optional tiebacks could have been designed and installed
which would have adequately supported the adjacent highway
before or even after the February 2003 sliding event. Other
means to improve stability of the bank to about the level or
greater than that which existed prior to riverside construction
would have been to install: 1. A concrete secant retaining wall
with upslope riprap cover; or 2. a tie-back soldier pile and
lagging system (or a soil-nail supported wall in lieu of tiebacks) west of the highway guard rail near the crest of the
slope.
These retaining systems would be designed based on an
adjacent construction subsurface exploration program. Once
installed, any of these methods of slope stabilization would
have allowed riverside construction to continue unabated.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This investigation study was conducted into the cause(s) of the
sliding of the riverbank during the construction of the water
intake structure in Tennessee. The water intake facilities
included the construction of a pump station, a wet well and 236 in. diameter intake pipes into the river.
The horizontal distance between the well and the inlet was 290
ft. The plans and specifications allowed for trench excavation
from the inlet at Station 0+00 to into the riverbank at about
Station 1+00. Subaqueous excavation methods used by the
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Contractor included: drill and blast, “clamming”, hand
excavation, by excavator and pin hammering. Subaqueous
excavation continued without any concern until the sliding
event which occurred on October 10-11, 2002. The sliding
surface was covered with tarps and excavation was continued
for over 4 months until another slide occurred on February 20,
2003. This slide was about 15 ft wide making the cumulative
slide width equal to 40 ft. This event appeared to be triggered
by a drop in the river level. The fundamental cause of the
October 2002 and February 2003 slides was the subaqueous
excavation into the riverbank. The cut into the riverbank toe
resulted in making the slope vulnerable to instability. Because
of incomplete geotechnical information a higher rock and soil
contact elevation was assumed, and therefore, a less favorable
slope stability condition existed than envisioned. The open
cut to about Station 1+00 resulted in significant undercut or
undermining of the toe of soil portion of the slope. Moreover,
the subaqueous method of pipe installation does not provide
sufficient control of the excavation based on underwater
inspection and monitoring of the slope.

REFERENCES
Duncan, J.M., and Wright, S.G. [2005]. “Soil Strength and
Slope Stability”. Wiley, Hoboken, New Jersey, 312 p.
Hoek, E., Kaiser, P.K., and Bawden, W.F. [2000]. “Support
of Underground Excavations in Hard Rock”. Taylor &
Francis, Oxford, UK, 300 p.
Hung, C.J., Monsees, J., Munfah, N., and Wisniewski, J.
[2009]. “Technical Manual for Design and Construction of
Road Tunnels”. Civil Engineers, Technical Report, FHWANHI-10-034, 702 p.
Peck, R.B. [1969]. “Advantages and Limitations of the
Observational Method in Applied Soil Mechanics”.
Geotechnique, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 171-187.

Paper No. 4.06a

9

